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“Dialogic understanding of phenomena in different fields of the humanities;
Finding common grounds and diversities.”

Introduction
I am not a scholar of literature but wholeheartedly embrace Mikhail Bakhtin’s (1992)1
dialogism in my work. However, unlike Bakhtin, my starting point is not written
discourse but rather the human use of language in face-to-face communication and
what it does (for example, Krippendorff, 1989, 2000)2 from which Bakhtin drew much of
his inspiration as well. I recognize that we all begin as oral beings. Nevertheless, as soon
as we have learned to speak and respond to the articulations of others, we are
confronted with strings of characters, instructed to read and write them, and start to
think in terms of words, sentences, propositions, letters, and contracts. I am always
amazed when reflecting on how much individual and institutional effort it takes for us to
become literate members of society and to equate language with writing at the expense
of its oral origin. To me, conversation is our primary cultural artifact. The abstract
system of language, presumably governed by phonetic and syntactic rules that
Saussurean linguists have constructed, is an institutionalized imposition on oral
communication. While the benefits of writing are not in doubt, in this paper I am
exploring how various social constraints on our primary cultural artifact— not only in
the form of texts—generate other interactive artifacts, whether unintended or by design.

1

2

2

Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. (Austin: University of Texas
Press,1992)
Klaus Krippendorff, “On the Ethics of Constructing Communication,” in Rethinking
Communication: Paradigm Issues, Vol .I, ed. B. Dervin, L. Grossberg, B. J. O'Keefe and E.
Wartella (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989), 66-96.
Klaus Krippendorff, “Ecological Narratives: Reclaiming the Voice of Theorized Others,” in The
Art of the Feud; Reconceptualizing International Relations, ed. J. V. Ciprut (Westport, CT:
Praeger Publishers. 2000), 1-26.
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Bakhtin proposed a way of reading texts not as a sequence of well-formed
sentences conceptualized by structural linguists, or as a network of propositions about
the world on which logical positivists insist, but as the voices behind written texts. For
Bakhtin, these voices belong not only to their authors, which is the primary focus of
many contemporary literary interpretations, but also to those written of, explicitly
quoted, and implicitly invoked, the presumed readers. What attracted me to his
conceptions is that he always grounded his reading of texts in human speech. Words, he
insisted, do not exist until they are spoken, and, when printed, bear the signature of
their speakers and listeners without whom we rarely speak. He also recognized that
most of what authors write reproduces what they have learned from others. A recent
book by two cognitive scientists come to a conclusion, unexpected in the cognitive
sciences, that we can never think alone (Sloman & Fernbach, 2017).3 Thus, there are
always many voices speaking through a text to readers in particular situations. It follows
that texts bring together histories of writing, individual authors, addressees, and the
actions that follow from them. It is the latter that has fueled my interest in social
constructions (Krippendorff, 1989, 2005)4 and design. Let me mention a few more of
Bakhtin’s concepts that were attractive to me. One is his notion that we cannot see
ourselves without the articulations of others. Any self is always interacting with other
selves (Bakhtin, 1992; Holquist, 1990; Sampson, 1993; Shotter, 1993).5 There is no fixed
human nature that philosophers could uncover. As Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958)6 taught
us, even philosophy consists of language games that philosophers play. Moreover, in
opposition to the certainty of dictionary definitions of word meaning and the search for
correct interpretations by legal or administrative authorities, Bakhtin insisted that all
texts are polyphonic, metaphorically bringing multiple voices into interaction. His
polyphonic concept of truth suggests that when two people disagree, it cannot be
assumed that one of them must be right. Finally, Bakhtin suggested that all utterances
represent distinct points of view. There are no neutral perspectives or positions from
which we speak or write. To me, the multiplicity of distinct discourses gives us many
positions from which we can proceed.
3

4
4

5
5
5

5
6

Steven Sloman, and Philip Fernbach, The Knowledge Illusion; Why We Never Think Alone. (New
York: Riverhead Books, 2017).
Krippendorff, “On the Ethics of Constructing Communication,”
Klaus Krippendorff, “The Social Construction of Public Opinion,” in Kommunikation über
Kommunikation. Theorie, Methoden und Praxis. E. Wienand, J. Westerbarkey, and A. Scholl eds.
(Wiesbaden, Germany: VS-Verlag, 2005), 129-149.
Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays.
Michael Holquist, Dialogism; Bakhtin and his World. (London and New York: Routledge, 1990)
Edward E. Sampson, Celebrating the Other; A Dialogic Account of Human Nature. (Boulder, CO:
Westview, 1993)
John Shotter, Conversational Realities. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1993).
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York:
Macmillan, 1958).
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So, when we say we talk or write about something, we are directing our attention
to the world outside language which blinds us to what we are doing in language. As
Jürgen Habermas noted, “it makes a difference whether we speak with one another or
merely about one another.” (2010:16)7 Aboutness privileges a representational view of
language, a perspective that situates reality outside of us which the later Wittgenstein
sought to overcome and I do not want to privilege. To sidestep aboutness, I invite you to
read the following not to decide whether I am right or wrong, whether what I am saying
is Bakhtinian or not, or whether my assertions are factually correct. My hope is that the
distinctions I will be introducing resonate with your experiences, and that they
encourage new possibilities of listening, reading, and being in language. In the spirit of
dialogue, your response would mean a lot to me. Unfortunately, the medium of writing
delays that possibility.
Let me add that I am a designer by background and an occasional participant in
larger design projects. However, I spent most of my academic career as a scholar of
human communication. For me, designing means developing and planting seeds of
innovations that are valued by members of particular communities. By innovations, I
mean products, practices, or policies that are not caused by nature. They require human
ingenuity. To be clear, I do not think the ability to create innovations is the exclusive
province of professional designers. Design is fundamental to being human. Planning
one’s career, taking family pictures, or arranging chairs for a meeting, are acts of design,
as are creating websites, constructing billboards, building bridges, designing scientific
experiments, or developing national policies. However, in various publications
(especially Krippendorff, 2006),8 I have limited my attention to the professional design
of human-centered or culturally sensitive artifacts, that is, of artifacts that people speak
of, consider meaningful, and can actually interface with and connect through them with
each other. Professional design is distinct from everyday design by being primarily
focused on the benefits provided to others. I want to continue that focus here, but wish
to distinguish this kind of design, on the one hand, from technology-centered design—
engineering or chemistry for example, which pursue technical specifications—and on
the other hand, from everyday design, mainly for personal use. Designing in
collaboration with experts requires specialized vocabularies to develop ideas into
realistic proposals. This vocabulary must also enable designers to communicate, explain,
and argue for the value of their developments to those who can realize and ultimately
benefit from them. This is the task of a compelling design discourse (Krippendorff, 2006,

7

8

Jürgen Habermas, et al. An awareness of what is missing, trans. C. Cronin (Malden, MA: Polity
Press, 2010).
Klaus Krippendorff, The Semantic Turn; A New Foundation for Design. (Boca Raton, FL, London,
New York: Taylor & Francis CRC Press, 2006).
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2009a).9
This paper develops the features of a design discourse that enables designers to
collaborate on projects, bringing human-centered and culture sensitive artifacts into
being. The uniqueness of such a discourse is best demonstrated by comparing it with
conversation and a few familiar discourse genres from which it must distinguish itself.
Let me sketch the steps by which this paper will proceed:
•

Genuine conversation or dialogue

•

Some forms of communication into which genuine conversation can erode

•

What distinguishes discourses from conversations and from each other

•

Discursive practices that tend to become computations

•

Meanings of cultural artifacts in the public domain

•

Design discourse – ideal and in practice

Genuine Conversation or Dialogue
To me:
•

Genuine conversations are common, mundane, and voluntary occurrences
involving two or more interacting participants. They may happen in the privacy
of a home or in public places, between people who find themselves next to each
other, among friends or acquaintances but without expectations of a particular
outcome.

9

•

Conversations build on their participants’ experiences in prior conversations, not
necessarily with the same individuals. Developmentally, conversations begin
with a mother and her baby, making each other laugh. They become more
complex in time and involve other participants, but remain just as invigorating.

•

Analytically, for outside observers of conversations, the voices of their
participants may be traced to previous encounters. However, for the most part,
speakers do not know where their words came from, are unaware of echoing
anyone in particular, and identify themselves with the vocabulary they call their
own. Under these conditions, I consider conversational participants genuine,
articulating the voices they consider their own.

Krippendorff, The Semantic Turn.
Krippendorff, “Discourse as Systematically Constrained Conversation,” in his On
Communicating: Otherness, Meaning, and Information, ed. F. Bermejo (New York: Routledge,
2009a), 217-234.

9 Klaus
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•

Conversations are self-organizing. Outsiders do not matter in what happens in
genuine interactions. The meanings of the braided histories that emerge in that
process, including any rules adopted, are unique to a particular conversation.
Triads form, consisting of speakers and their listeners in alternating roles, what
was said previously, and how that history is extended by responding to each
other with respect.
Being self-organizing implies that outside observers of conversations have no access
to the experiences, meanings, and the sense of being able to shape what is
happening as a part of one. Observations, recordings, or transcripts of
conversations belong to a different experiential domain.
•

In genuine conversations, everything said or done is said or done in the expectation
of being held accountable for it (Shotter, 1984).10 This mutuality defines the
condition of dialogical equality. Equality is not measurable in terms of the amount
or quality of participants’ contribution but rather by whether participants’
understanding becomes coordinated. In dialogical terms, understanding is the
condition of having no further questions to ask and dialogical equality manifests
itself when all voices are being heard.
To be clear, understanding is a personal matter. Nobody has direct access to
anyone else’s understanding, nor can anyone claim one’s understanding to be
shared or in agreement with someone else’s. In conversations, it is natural to
construct a partner’s understanding from what he or she has said. The assurance
“I understand” indicates a state of satisfaction with what was heard and a
suggestion to go on. Coordinations of this kind manifest multiple reflexive loops:
We make assumptions regarding how our addressees interpret what we are
saying or doing. We create expectations of what would prompt our addressees to
hold us accountable for what we were saying or doing. Whether actually asked to
offer an account for what we said or did, in the very act of speaking and doing we
can hardly avoid anticipating how the account we might give for what we do
when requested will be received, hoping that the addressees will accept them as
plausible, and so on. Similar reflexive loops could be articulated for the
addressees. Genuine conversations flow naturally within such reflexive loops.

•

10

Conversations are irreversible. Everything said adds to the joint history as
understood in each participant’s own terms. What is said cannot be undone, it
can only be qualified. For example, a participant may clarify her utterance or
apologize for saying something untoward. Accounts of this kind may well alter

John Shotter, Social Accountability and Selfhood, (New York: Blackwell, 1984)
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the meaning of what was said or done, but they too remain part of the braided
history that a conversation is weaving.
•

In genuine conversations, participants provide spaces for each other to respond
and preserve the possibility of conversations to continue indefinitely – perhaps
after some time, perhaps with different participants, perhaps concerning
something else. Interruptions of genuine conversations may happen for reasons
of having to do something else, moving to a distant place, or the death of a
participant. However, such occurrences may not prevent their continuation at a
later time or with others. However, when purposes enter a conversation or a
problem to be solved, conclusions tend to define an end point. Such
conversations are no longer genuine. Moreover, when conversations turn into
physical violence, conversation has ended for good.

•

Conversations are the fastest evolutionary process I know. Conversations rarely
ever repeat themselves. They introduce variations in the form of new
compositions of known parts, such as of utterances, words, tropes, or narratives.
Responses reveal the merits of what was said, being either selectively developed
to the point of common satisfaction, or left dormant in favor of something else to
emerge. In conversations, compositions draw on many more units than biological
evolution – mutations and selections – can. And the survival of ideas in
conversations is almost instantaneously evident and involves all participants –
unlike in biological processes, where mating involves two organisms and the
viability of their offspring may require years to be evident. According to Joshua
Wolf Shenk (2014),11 virtually all innovations, whether in science, technology,
literature, or the arts, are due to engaging in conversations with someone else,
even with virtual others.

•

Conversations may create artifacts. The braided histories of interactions,
experienced and referred to, disappear with the death of their participants. But
conversations may also compel their participants to act outside conversations,
leaving physical traces behind that may well last beyond the lifespan of the actors
and cannot be explained without their engagement in particular conversations.

Some Forms of Communication into Which Genuine Conversation Can Erode

11

Joshua Wolf Shenk, Powers of Two: Finding the Essence of Innovation in Creative Pairs, (Boston,
MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014).
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Martin Buber observed that ideal dialogue is empirically rare. We experience dialogical
moments at which we find ourselves in unconstrained commonality with others (Cissna
& Anderson, 2002)12 and converse freely; what emerges enriches all of its participants.
Why would one bother to conceptualize something that is only rarely
experienced? I contend that it is never easy to understand what it is to be human until
experiencing something missing. For example, conditions such as the feeling of being
unable to say what is on one’s minds for fear of getting into trouble, being asked to
follow rules that do not make sense, or being dismissed as incompetent or insignificant,
deviate from the unencumbered flow of genuine conversations and call for explanations
of what is going on there. In such situations, authentic conversation serves as the
unwritten standard against which current communication situations are distinguished,
evaluated, and given a name, whether accepted as such or questioned and renegotiated.
Ideal dialogue or genuine conversations can be conceived as one endpoint of a
continuum from which practical communication situations systematically deviate. It is
the experience of constraints that transform genuine conversations into other forms of
communication (Krippendorff, 2009b),13 not just dialogue into monologue.
The most obvious intrusion into genuine conversations may well be due to
relying on media of communication. Telephone conversations lack visual cues, smells,
and touch expected in face-to face encounters but they are still interactive and called
conversations. When more than two people are involved, say in conference calls, the
absence of eye contact and gestures makes turn-taking exceedingly difficult and imposes
additional constraints on conversations. Letter writers can employ typographical
conventions – punctuating, quoting, underlining, bolding, or using emoji – but they do
not substitute for eye contact, gestures, sound, and emotional expressions. Writing
letters furthermore delays responses from their addresses. Published literature is
almost completely removed from participating in genuine conversation by the
uncertainty of who will read it, when, how, and why, whether a response ever reaches
its author and whether the author changes what was written. The voices that Bakhtin
conceptualized are metaphorical constructions resulting from his imaginative
interpretations of texts. They are not actually heard and cannot be literally interacted
with.
Beyond medial constraints, we also are familiar with debates, expected to
distinguish winners from losers, job interviews, lectures or instructions, verdicts read in
court, or declarations of war. They exemplify dialogical inequalities that are
irreconcilable with genuine conversations. However, such speech acts or genres are
Kenneth N. Cissna, and Rob Anderson, Moments of Meeting: Buber, Rogers, and the Potential for
Public Dialogue. (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002).
13 Krippendorff, Discourse as Systematically Constrained Conversation.
12

Discourses in the Design of Cultural Artefacts

Klaus Krippendorff

mere parts of other characteristics that permit genuine conversations to erode into
something else. Let me mention just four ways.
First, individuals may chose not to speak for themselves but as members of a
community, occupants of an office, as experts on a subject matter, in the name of absent
others, or as designated leaders. Introducing absent, fictional, or abstract others into
conversations transforms them into games of unequal representatives, invoking
seemingly unquestionable authorities. Such games are no longer self-organizing as the
absent outsiders speak through one or more participants who cannot be held
accountable for what is said on their behalf. François Coren (2014)14 speaks of
ventriloquism in which the speaker hides behind the voices of absent others. Addressees
do not really know who or what generates the ventriloquized voices, how real they are,
or how to negotiate with them.
Second, interactions between customers and sales personnel, between therapists
and their clients, or between professors and their students, are not between individuals
but between the institutional roles they play, reducing accountability to the categories
performed.
Third, many social communications are purposive. When people come together
to achieve a goal, only relevant contributions count. In job interviews, candidates are
expected to prove their qualifications. Interviewers speak for the employer and test the
candidates’ stories against criteria rarely revealed to the candidate. Board meetings are
primed to come to decisions. Their social structures surface in who is allowed to speak,
deemed worth listening to, and has the right to articulate the concluding decision,
binding for all members. There is no point for purposive deliberations to continue
beyond achieving their goal. It is not impossible, of course, for dialogical moments to
occur even in highly structured situations, among co-workers, in mentor-student
consultations, or during psychotherapy, but these are not only rare occurrences but also
irrelevant to achieving the goal that brought these people to talk to one another.
Fourth, some discourse analysts, prominently Michael Foucault (1972),15 invoke
physical metaphors of power to explain what fuels discursive actions in society. I side
with Gregory Bateson (1972)16 who insisted that the use of physical metaphors in
explanations of social interactions is misguided. Disagreeing with Foucault, I am
suggesting that dialogical inequalities rarely arise from unequal command of physical
powers, but from submission, the unwillingness to question those who claim to speak
from the position of authority. Admittedly, holding authorities accountable for what they
François Coren, Action and Agency in Dialogue: Passion, Incarnation, and Ventriloquism,
(Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2014)
15 Michael Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M.S. Sheridan, (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1972).
16 Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1972).
14
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say or do may not be easy, especially when they refuse to be held accountable for actions
by those affected, which is the complement of submission. Clearly, authorities and social
hierarchies of superiorities and subordinations are constructed and enacted in language
not explainable by the laws of physics. Similarly troublesome is Bruno Latour’s (2005)17
unwillingness to distinguish between linguistically evident human agency and physical
forces. To be clear, I do take material considerations seriously (Krippendorff, 2011),18
whether in the form of the above-mentioned constraints by media of communication,
legal imprisonment, or violence. The mechanical properties of all artifacts undoubtedly
constrain some human abilities while extending others but they are neither actors nor
drivers. Physical explanations are indifferent to language. For example, everything that
happens before the trigger of a loaded weapon is pulled is social. It involves alternatives,
is embedded in communications, and is open to conversations – at least ideally. Once a
bullet has left the weapon, causality governs its trajectory and no argument can change
its course (Krippendorff, 1995).19 Physical explanations may well enter human
interactions after language has run its course.
The above examples suggest that the experience of constraints on genuine
conversations generate numerous forms of human communication whose decreasing
dialogical freedom suggests a continuum, on which one can also locate discourses. That
freedom may become constrained beyond discourse, up to the point at which routine
and repetitious interactions become replaceable by mechanisms and computational
algorithms, including violence. The reality of computations is always designed, that is, of
human origin, but its characteristics are unlike human interaction. On this continuum,
computational mechanisms can be considered the extreme opposite of genuine
conversation, as depicted in Figure 1.

Genuine Conversation → Communication → Discourse → Computation
Figure 1

What Distinguishes Discourses from Conversations and from Each Other?
Let me move along the continuum in Figure 1, defining discourse and illustrating its
definition with three of its genres. To avoid confusion, I deviate from the most common
dictionary definitions of discourse that equate it with a body of writing. This is also
Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2005).
18 Klaus Krippendorff, “Discourse and the Materiality of its Artifacts,” in Matters of
Communication: Political, Cultural, and Technological Challenges to Communication Theorizing,
ed. T. R. Kuhn, (New York: Hampton Press, 2011), 23-46.
19 Klaus Krippendorff, “Undoing Power,” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 12, no. 2 (1995):
101-132.
17
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Foucault’s starting definition. I am pursuing a more inclusive conception, however,
briefly defined as the social use of language in talk, text, communication, action, and what
they produce or leave behind. To start, all of the well-known discourses – legal, medical,
religious, mathematical – involve larger communities, can be practiced across different
natural languages, but are incommensurate relative to each other. For example,
mathematicians speak a language that lawyers have no reason to understand. Indian
computer programmers can communicate more easily with American or Russian
computer programmers than with, say, sociologists. The legal discourse has nothing to
do with the discourse of geologists, astronomers, physicists, politicians, and medical
professionals. Incommensurability distinguishes among these, unlike discourse genres.
Moreover, discourses exist only when practiced. Individual members of discourse
communities are never permanently engaged as members. They sleep or engage in
private matter. People can move through different discourses provided they have the
competence to cross their boundaries. So, when statisticians see a psychotherapist, they
enter that therapist’s discourse as clients. When students demonstrate for political
change, they play a role in the public discourse. With this rough sketch, let me spell out
the dimensions that I believe all discourses have in common (Krippendorff, 2009a),20
some more decisively than others.
Discourses

20

•

Manifest themselves materially in a body of discourse-specific artifacts they
characteristically produce and attend to. Artifacts may consist of texts, objects,
theories, social practices, technologies, and physical structures – everything that
remains after their participants have left.

•

Are kept alive by a discourse community whose members use specialized
vocabularies that give them a sense of understanding each other, are able to work
together, attend to their body of artifacts, and manage their communities as
participants.

•

Institutionalize recurrent practices, for instance, by ensuring the correct use of
their vocabularies, whether in the form of official dictionaries or publication style
manuals, requiring references to canonical texts, standardizing methods for
inquiry into, constructing and evaluating their artifacts. Discourses may support
journals that regularly inform members of their discourse community of relevant
developments. There are educational tracks, certifications, presentations, titles
and offices that preserve the stability and coherence of a discourse, generally
beyond the lifespan of their contributors.

Krippendorff, Discourse as Systematically Constrained Conversation.
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•

Maintain their own boundaries within which they organize themselves. The
boundary of a discourse distinguishes between what, who, or when something or
someone belongs and what, who, or when someone or something does not.
Strong discourses draw their own boundaries from within and protect them from
being invaded by alien discourses.

•

Justify themselves (the artifacts produced, the methods used to create them,
and how members are recruited to their discourse communities) to their
stakeholders. Successful justifications assure access to the needed financial,
material, and human resources that preserve the reputation of a discourse and its
continuation within their boundary.

•

Are constituted intermittently as their contributors (members of discourse
communities) are able to cross discursive boundaries within the institutionalized
constraints imposed by the discourses entered.

This conception of discourse extends Bakhtinian speech genres (1986)21 by adding
considerations of the discourse communities that practice them, the institutions that
uphold them, and the realities they bring forth within self-maintained boundaries (not
imposed by outside observers). Discourses could also be characterized as the social
enactment of articulated knowledge within particular communities, not merely what is
published. Let me illustrate the above dimensions by means of three familiar but very
unlike genres: the discourse of literary scholarship, the discourse of the natural sciences,
and public discourse.
The discourse of literary scholarship.
The definition of literature has been debated for ages and remains dynamic for good
reasons. Etymologically, it concerns texts of enduring significance. This characterization
invokes qualities that distinguish literature from ordinary writing, for example, from
journalistic accounts, business communications, or everyday prose. In their extremes,
these qualities are obvious: poetry stands out for its aesthetic and rhythmic qualities,
mythologies for narrating basic human tragedies, and novels for enabling contemporary
readers to understand today’s experiences. Objective identification of the formal
features of literary qualities in written texts is difficult, ultimately impossible—not only
because ordinary use of language, from which it needs to deviate, is constantly shifting,
but also because texts have no meanings without their readers who cannot escape living
in the present of an ever-changing culture, and not in its past nor in its future. One needs
21

Mikhail Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, eds. C. Emerson and M. Holquist, trans.
V. W. McGee, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1986).
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to be reminded that the linguistic forms of avant-garde poetry often become common
language in future iterations.
Texts have physicality. They last as long as the medium that bears its marks
endures. But literature is not a physical phenomenon. It is what scholars of literature
decide to celebrate and study. Among all the texts that a society generates, the
community of literary scholars selects those worthy of their interpretations as
literature, texts they understand as having qualities they consensually value. There are
of course different schools of literary scholarship, the community of Bakhtin scholars
being one. Bakhtin’s way of reading literature was and still is revolutionary, an
innovation that spread through this scholarly community and created a rich vocabulary
centered on voices, new distinctions among speech genres, interpretations, analyses,
and critiques, but not for all literary scholars. Literature does not equal textual
materiality, it needs to be read and spoken of. By all measures, the body of literature of
interest to literary scholarship is created. It consists of discourse–specific artifacts,
acknowledging different schools.
Literary scholars not only know each other as members of their discourse
community by their use of a shared vocabulary of literary terms, they also maintain their
institutions: archives of canonical texts; regular conferences where methods of analysis
and text interpretations are debated, legitimized or dismissed; regularly published
journals that feature scholarly contributions and exemplify the ethical standards of
literary scholarship; and places of instruction, for examples at universities. In
universities and at meetings of literary scholars, discursive boundaries are drawn and
defended against possible incursions by opposing schools and disciplines that do not
belong. Within these boundaries the discourse of literary scholarship is self-organizing.
Readership surveys, sales figures, copyright considerations, content analyses, or
governmental decrees do not matter to literary scholarship and are in fact viewed as
belonging to other discourses.
Literary scholarship has to justify itself, if only to encourage popular celebration
of its works and attract new members to its discourse community, a requirement for the
discourse to remain viable and insure the flow of funds that maintain its institutions, as
well as to create influential connoisseurs among readers on whom its reputation
depends. Without compelling justifications for the discourse of literary scholarship, it is
unlikely to survive.
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Scientific discourse
Scientific discourse is far more structured, institutionalized, and established in society
than any discourse of the humanities. The body of its artifacts—of physics, for
example—consists of causal theories of a consistent universe. These artifacts are
intrinsically linked to the instruments that scientists have developed and
institutionalized to generate and test data in support of their theories. They also include
the material structures in which science is practiced. It is important to note that,
committed to construct a causally determined universe exclusive of other explanations;
physicists are unwilling if not unable to acknowledge their own role in creating the
artifacts they leave behind for future physicists to build on. Apparently, physicists see no
problem in claiming to collect their data – as if the data predated their interest in them –
find theories that underlie them – as if these theories would govern an unobserved
reality – and consequently call what they discover “laws of nature.”
Obviously, without the creative effort of the increasingly capable community of
physicists, the theories and models of the field would not exist. They are artifacts by all
definitions, as are the instruments that are constructed to generate data in support of
particular theories.
Physics is institutionalized, for example, by requiring researchers to go through
established curricula, earn academic degrees as a condition for membership in their
discourse community, uphold the ontological commitments of their discourse, rely on
mathematical accounts (which are intrinsically biased in favor of causal and
deterministic formulations), use standardized experimental methods, participate in
recurrent scientific meeting, read peer-reviewed publications, and work at universities
where physics is taught and in labs where it is practiced.
The boundary of physics excludes practical, applied, social, and especially
spiritual discourses (from which physics extricated itself during the Enlightenment). Its
boundary is well defined. No outsider would be allowed to define what physics is, dares
to challenge the qualifications of physicists, or question the validity of their theoretical
contributions to its discourse.
While essentially self-organizing and closed as far as the practices of physicists
are concerned, even physics needs to justify itself to those it relies on. Its stakeholders
include such applied disciplines as engineering, architecture, computer science, and
space travel, as well as funding agencies, all of which need to find value in the artifacts
that physics produces. The human resources needed to replenish the discourse
community of physicists tends to be created by several layers of popularizations of its
accomplishments, ranging from popular science magazines, introductory texts for
primary education, science fairs in high schools, science fiction, up to and including
serious textbooks.
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Public discourse
Public discourse embraces everything that could be of concern for any number of people
and be spoken of in public, that is, under the watchful eye of bystanders. It takes place in
the public sphere (Habermas, 1992).22 Unlike the two scholarly discourses discussed
above, the public sphere is open, ideally to everyone who can speak a shared language
and has the common good in mind.
Public discourse is practiced in small face-to-face encounters: sidewalk cafés,
public celebrations, big sports events, political demonstrations, and revolutions. It is
fueled by popular literature and news. It goes beyond the slogan on the banner of the
New York Times promising “All the News That’s Fit to Print” by including everything
worth talking of in public: art, music, poetry, gossip, scandals, carnival, and celebrities,
but also public transportation, popular movies, the use of new media, city planning, and
problems to be solved, whether evident to everyone, opined by some, merely rumored,
or opposed. The artifacts of public discourse could be characterized as the public
infrastructure of society, not to be confused with its technological base. Cars, for
example, are designed by engineers, but their shapes respond to how people speak of
them, who drives them, and the use to which they are put. The internet is a
computational network but what it contains and how it is used is very much determined
how people interact with and talk of it, whether as users, critics, or curious observers.
Open spaces have material dimensions but become public spaces when people feel
invited to gather there. The materiality of public artifacts persists when their users do
not attend to them or move away. Anthropologists rely on their durability when trying
to reconstruct an extinct culture, albeit in anthropological terms. Museums select from
them what they interpret as relevant to contemporary publics.
Its discourse community—or the public for short—organizes itself not just
around the public handling of cultural artifacts, but also by dividing itself into
neighborhoods, interest groups, ethnicities, generations, and political parties, and by
places of where people can meet or follow particular celebrities. This is to say that the
public is far from homogeneous, which is why the term public is often referred to in
plural.
Public discourse nourishes numerous institutions, starting with regularly
published newspapers, the regular release of new movies, the availability of
communication networks, public parks for people to gather, police that maintain public
order, commercial businesses, public services, and administrative offices open to
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everyone, scheduled sports events, public ceremonies, voting places, and much more.
They all follow rules—some regulated by law, others commonly understood.
Public discourse draws its boundaries by distinguishing itself—on the one hand,
from private matter, and on the other hand, from professional discourses whose
vocabularies are not widely shared or mastered. However, this boundary is often
breached; for example, when oversimplifications of expert discourses fuel public
opinion, turning established ecological, economic, and sociological facts into contentious
issues, or when the private affairs of celebrities are dug up by journalists and published.
Public discourse is vulnerable to strategic misinformation, libel, copyright violations,
constraints on participation (for example, voting restrictions), economic interest in
public opinion and commercial information (for example, paid political advertisements,
sponsored sites on Google, and revenues of newspapers tied to advertisement), cultural
barriers to equal access of public artifacts (for example, the digital divide between rich
and poor and different ethnicities), as well as governmental censorship.
Public discourse justifies itself as foundational to inclusive democratic
governments. It may not be recognized in authoritarian societies and curbed by
totalitarian regimes, which regard it as having the potential to undermine existing
conditions at opportune moments.
Regarding the last of the six-point definition of discourse, it is important to note
again that discourses are neither continuously active nor can they imprison their
contributors. They are alive only when and where they are practiced. Some discourses
remain dormant for periods of time and are revived when situations call for them.
Today, people acquire many more discursive competencies than in past centuries where
discursive mobility was far more restricted.
Recurrent Discursive Practices Tend to End in Computations
The institutionalization of its recurrent practices is probably the one dimension of
discourse that deviates most profoundly from conversations. Institutions manifest
themselves in persistent social structures and established interactions that are
habitually performed. In effect, institutions are the core framework of a discourse.
Adherence to them maintained its stability and ensure its coherence beyond the lifespan
of its human contributors. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966)23 observed that
institutions are inter-generationally transmitted without reference to their origins and
the problems they were meant to solve. With their histories no longer accessible,
institutions become objectified, inter-subjectively verifiably real, taken for granted,
formalized, and standardized. They become norms. For example, just as physics is
23
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practiced in unambiguous terms and relies on depersonalized methodological
standards, so are business practices in the public sphere regulated with deviations
pursued in court. Institutions exist whenever members of a discourse community expect
all other members to practice them. Acknowledging this reflexivity, Nelson Phillips and
Cynthia Hardy (2002)24 take institutions to be “self-policing,” that is, when some
members of a discourse community step out of line, other members make sure this
incurs costs.
Sociologists’ equation of institutions with social mechanisms or formal structures
turns out to be not merely metaphorical. Recurrent and mindlessly executed discursive
practices are the obvious candidates for substitution by computational mechanisms. For
example, we use traffic signs at street intersections in place of police officers to regulate
cross-traffic flow. For quite some time now, workers on assembly lines have been
replaced by robots. The routine part of the work of bookkeeping has been transformed
from notes on paper and manual calculations to electronic banking systems. Much of
today’s e-commerce requires human oversight beyond troubleshooting. Search engines
scan huge textual databases at an incredibly fast rate, but mainly via character
recognition, which is the most routine and unconscious ability human readers have
acquired. Ultrafast computer processes include trading on the stock market, automatic
surveillance, driverless cars, and unmanned warfare. Smartphone applications also
replace routine and recursive human practices.
Computational substitutes for institutional practices tend to emerge from the
language used to describe in near-causal terms what they replace. Once a practice is
completely codified and routinely enacted, it can easily be written in computer code.
This gives rise to devices that are increasingly incomprehensible to those who interface
with them, largely because hardware and software designers rely on discourses that
escape most ordinary users’ comprehension. To bridge this gap, interface designers try
to make use of metaphors derived from the practices they replaced. For example,
opening a document, filing it in a folder, and dragging it into a trashcan are useful
metaphors from the paper world that have nothing to do, however, with what a
computer does. Delegating institutional practices to computational mechanisms calls on
their users to invest a considerable amount of trust in the metaphors, which inform their
interfaces with them.
Not only are computational mechanisms difficult to understand—even with the
help of the discourse whose institutionalized practices they replace—trust in them may
have unanticipated consequences. On the positive side, they speed up or amplify the
production of its discursive artifacts. On the negative side, unintended consequences can
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create externalities that its discourse community is ill equipped to handle, such as the
instabilities that high-speed computer trading introduced in the stock market. The
inability of a discourse to keep up with what the computational substitutions of its
institutional practices set in motion is a defining problem of contemporary society.
Whether it is called information society or the cybernetic age, replacing institutions by
computational devices creates opportunities never before envisioned by the also
unanticipated and seriously problematic instabilities and limitations.
Meanings of Cultural Artifacts in the Public Domain
Cultural artifacts are populating the public sphere as soon as people speak of them,
perform with them in the presence of others, and judge their use and their users. One
prerequisite of exhibiting these qualities is that they mean something to those who
articulate a stake in them.
Regarding texts, this is obvious. Meanings are not literally contained in them.
They are institutionalized attributes that emerge in the process of reading. Without
having learned to read, arrangements of characters mean little to nothing. Moreover,
without the ability to discuss these meanings there would be no way to assure that texts
could communicate anything, coordinate interpersonal understanding, and enable
collective actions. Discussing texts forms communities of readers and is a prerequisite
for any functioning literary society. This is why cultural artifacts reside not only in the
privacy of subjective meaningfulness but also in the public sphere.
However, the meanings of tools, furniture, mechanical devices, advertisements,
exhibits, and services add an additional dimension. They are verifiable, at least in
principle, by what they suggest can be performed with them. Something called a car not
only needs to look like one for those who know what cars are, it also is expected to be
drivable. A church not only needs to be recognizable as such but also provide a space for
people to worship. What is referred to as a chair needs to enable someone to sit on it or
it fails the common understanding of a chair. Moreover, advertisements that promise
merchandise to have certain qualities need to live up to these promises. The possibility
of deception notwithstanding, how something is perceived and what it means needs to
be consistent with the experiences it promises when enacting its meanings.
All cultural artifacts can afford a multiplicity of meanings. Besides sitting, a chair
may be used to step up on it, keep something handy, change the diaper of a baby, display
the wealth of its owner, or fetch a price in a furniture store. Alternative uses tend to be
context dependent. On a construction site, a brick becomes part of a wall. In a garden, a
brick could confine a flower beet. In a living room, it may serve as a bookend. During a
violent encounter, it may become a deadly weapon. Virtually all cultural artifacts
promise multiple uses. This multiplicity is loosely related to Bakhtin’s conception of
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polyphony. However, it would be hard to imagine that usable artifacts have voices, as
Bakhtin’s metaphor encourages us to read texts. Human interfaces with artifacts offer
humans context-dependent choices of how to interact with them and their world.
Typically, interfaces are prolonged by intrinsically or extrinsically motivated interactions,
that is, actions followed by responses, followed by responses to these responses, and so
on. Intrinsic motivation manifests itself in emotional involvement for its own sake;
extrinsic motivation refers to the achievement of goals. Designers speak of artifacts as
possessing affordances (Gibson, 1979:127-135),25 defined as the range of the human
interfaces they are able to support. Whether their meanings appear visually obvious, are
recognizable only in certain contexts, are contained in written user instructions, or
emerge in conversations with others, whatever their source, the interfaces they inform
always are either afforded by the artifact or cause breakdowns in Martin Heidegger’s
sense (Dreyfus, 1992: 70-83).26 What breaks down, however, is not the artifact –
although this could happen as well – but how users enact the meanings they attribute to
them.
Speaking publicly of artifacts can profoundly affect their meanings. There are
many examples where perfectly functional artifacts failed to be useful because of the
circulation of stories that made them appear inefficient, unhealthy, or dangerous. Novel
artifacts need to be designed together with stories that invite users to try them out and
not lead to breakdowns.
Enacting the meanings of cultural artifacts into interfaces bears some
resemblance with conversation and dialogue. Computers, for example, offer their users
numerous options to act and then display their consequences on a screen. Because
computers are context-free and deterministic devices, they cannot comprehend as
humans do. For their users, the meanings of the computer icons reveal themselves in
what happens after clicking on them, much as the meanings of utterances in
conversations depend on the responses they elicit.
Another commonality concerns the principal inaccessibility of the internal
makeup what one interacts with. As already mentioned, computer users tend to have no
clue of what is going on inside the machine they are working with. The design of its
architecture is technology-centered and involves a sophisticated discourse that ordinary
users tend not to understand and do not care to become familiar with, as long as they
can interface with it. This is analogous to our principal inability to observe what is going
on inside someone else’s mind. Although we can ask partners in conversations how they
understood what we were saying, this, however, does not reveal anything about the
James Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, (Boston MA: Houghton Mifflin,
1979).
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neuronal processes in their brains. The fact that talking of what one understands stays
entirely within public discourse reveals the irrelevance of cognitive explanations. The
models we speak of when interacting with computers lead us to expectations of what
they will do. The models we entertain when interacting with fellow human beings
include not just expectations of how they react to what we say but also how they
respond in view of how they conceive of us, what they expect we do in response to their
response.
The meanings we construct in interaction with artifacts do not have to be that
reflexive – just as natural scientists have no reason to presume that their objects of
attention have a clue as to how they are observed. However, in communication with
fellow human beings, multiple reflexive loops are inevitably involved. Social scientists
who wish to understand and designers who wish to intervene in how humans interact
with each other through the cultural artifact at their disposal can no longer rely on a
representational or monological conception of meanings. Instead, they are encouraged
to employ a dialogical conception of how they participate in what they wish to
understand or change.
Design Discourse—as an Ideal and In Practice
In the introduction, I characterized designing as developing and planting the seeds of
innovations in receptive communities. Biological evolution notwithstanding, design does
not develop accidentally or causally. Innovation by design is antithetical to causality. It
requires deliberate, ingenious, and coordinate human actions. Cities, cars, furniture, and
art objects do not spring forth as trees do from seeds, they emerge in prolonged
translations of discourses into institutionally coordinated actions by communities. The
reference to communities highlights the cultural ground and the reference to
institutionally-coordinated actions highlights the social organizations through which
designed artifacts may come to fruition. Inasmuch as design is for the benefit of others, I
suggested that design process must be guided by a design discourse, a vocabulary and
language that enables designers to develop their designs, proposals, or plans, and to
compellingly argue for the value of realizing or using their designs by those who can be
enrolled in their projected.
I should mention that attention to what discourses do is not encouraged by the
common conception of language and knowledge, taught in schools and provided by the
sciences. The lack of awareness that language, when performed, produces something
besides its own usefulness has a long history. Since the Enlightenment, scientific
discourses have been committed to an understanding of the world as it exists. Scientific
theories describe and explain the world in third-person terms, linguistically and
normatively excluding the observing theorists for fear of introducing so-called observer
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biases. If designers aim to introduce innovations, propose artifacts without precedent,
which could not have been observed previously and could not have provided the
benefits they hold in their womb, designers cannot rely on a discourse concerned with
theorizing observational data. Their discourse cannot be held hostage to the logic, truth
claims, and generalizations from the past, least of all on the conception of a nature that
excludes scientific observers’ interest in them, or ontology for short. While natural
scientists are correct in claiming that their theories are predictive beyond available data,
their predictions assume, however, that the patterns their theories generalize from past
observations continue to hold in the future independent of human agency. Natural
scientific theories have no place for human innovations. A commitment to causal
conceptions of reality would make the design profession irrelevant.
Starting in 1964, Horst Rittel argued for the distinction between scientists who
construct their universe by excluding features external to their discourses and designers
who cannot afford such restrictions when innovation is their aim (Protzen & Harris,
2010: 48-52).27 In his “The Sciences of the Artificial,” Herbert Simon (1969: 58-62)28
suggested that the logic of design is declarative or deontic, not descriptive. For him,
design is concerned with what should be rather than what is. I do not consider that his
formulation goes far enough, since Simon modeled his conception of design largely on
the development of technology or systems that ignored how humans interfaced with
them. Interestingly, Rittel and Simon’s distinguishing between scientific knowledge and
the world of designers has a rarely cited history: In opposition to René Descartes’s
insistence that true knowledge can only be obtained through observation, the
eighteenth-century Italian political philosopher Giambattista Vico argued convincingly
that humans know best what they have made and not what is. His verum factum
principle states “truth resides in being made.” It informed his seminal work, Scienza
nuova (“New Science”; Vico, 1744/1968), a treatise of how civilizations emerge.29 While
none of these three writers acknowledged the meanings that the products of design
could have for the communities affected by them, Rittel (Protzen & Harris, 2010: 188195)30 came close to that acknowledgement by identifying design with the development
of defensible plans for interventions or compelling arguments for future artifacts. He
was one of the few who recognized that design is not separable from what the use of
language can accomplish when enacted.

Jean-Pierre Protzen and David J. Harris, The Universe of Design: Horst Rittel’s Theories of
Design and Planning. (New York: Routledge, 2010).
28 Herbert A. Simon, Herbert A. (1969). The Sciences of the Artificial. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1969).
29 Giambattista Vico, (1744/1968). The New Science of Giambattista Vico, 3rd ed. trans. T. G.
Bergin and M. H. Fisch, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1744/1968).
30 Protzen and Harris, The Universe of Design.
27

Discourses in the Design of Cultural Artefacts

Klaus Krippendorff

Since innovations, by definition, cannot be predicted from the past, the above
supports the view that a design discourse must be grounded in an epistemology that
provides spaces for human actions to create worlds rather than blindly submitting to a
causally determined ontology. To open up such spaces, designers need to explore
whether claimed causalities are mere fictions, based on data that no longer matter, or
whether they conceal openings to be escaped from. Designers need to boldly question
the cultural blindness regarding what language does, the habitual enactment of
ontological commitments, the existing social structures that resist innovations, and the
data cited in support of truth claims. Whatever the reasons for resisting change in the
midst of cultural artifacts, designers’ willingness to systematically question these
certainties and reduce those associated with innovations is what generates possibilities
for practicing design.
A design discourse needs to embolden designers to be fearlessly critical of
knowledge claims of what cannot be done of what is taken for granted, of taboos,
institutional interests in material culture, and scientific determinism. Let me discuss
some of the properties of a design discourse that create and preserve spaces of
possibilities for developing innovations and planting them in receptive communities.
• Its artifacts. Designs that leave a design firm may take the form of drawings,
presentations, prototypes, computer simulations, or suggestions for practices,
but their materiality is unlike what designers seek to accomplish with them. The
artifacts of a design discourse propose something not yet in existence—an
innovation, something that would not come about naturally. Thus, whether a
design bears fruit is not knowable at the time of its proposal. It may prove itself in
a distant future or not at all. Proof of the realizability and actual value of a design
lies outside its proponents’ control.
Physicists, by contrast, prove their theories by creating evidence that validate
said theories by criteria enshrined in the discourse of physics. Similarly,
interpretations by literary scholars are always made in the presence of available
texts. However, the future success of any design is contingent on those who have
a stake in them; that is, by their stakeholders.
By definition, stakeholders have diverse interests, possess the intellectual and
material resources to support or oppose a design, can articulate their convictions
publicly, and are able to mobilize others to their cause. Whether designed artifacts
end up populating the public domain depends on their designers’ ability to
anticipate their stakeholders’ voices and their ability to convince them of the
benefits of playing a part in realizing them.
The need to listen to those on whom the success of a design depends is not a new
suggestion. Market surveys have informed design practices since the industrial
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era, and recent, called for, user-centered design has become fashionable. The
former assumes that the buyers of industrial products are the only ones that
count, the latter, that the so-called end-users are the ones who matter. Such
narrow focuses have the effect of hiding the diverse stakeholders in a design who
ultimately determine whether it succeeds or is forgotten. The stakeholders of a
design certainly include its projected users or consumers; but they are also the
clients who listen to the designers’ ideas and pass them on to decision makers.
The latter might include the board members of a corporation who deliberate on
whether a design fits its public image. They may involve engineers who work out
the technical details for the artifact to be produced and work reliably. The voices
of bankers who consider investing in its production surely play a role. There
typically are government regulators, marketing experts, advertisers, distributors,
sellers, and, following the actual realization of the artifact, there are critics,
suppliers of needed resources, and advocacy groups worried about the political,
economic, or ecological consequences of the design. The stakeholders of any
design do not consist of uniform masses of individuals, as might be conceived in a
market of buyers; they differ vastly in what a design means to them, the
intellectual and economic resources they are willing to make available, and their
ability to cooperate in networks that can bring a design to fruition. Some such
stakeholder networks may be frozen, such as within a manufacturer, but most
stakeholders pursue their own stakes in a design and relate to each other not by
simply following procedure but by being energized by the designers’ project and
willing to do more than merely follow instructions. To succeed, the artifacts of a
design discourse would have to have attributes that not only encourage the
needed networks of stakeholders to form but also find a path through them.
In view of the foregoing, a design discourse that conceptualizes its artifacts as
symbolic representations of what designers want to see realized—for example,
artistic renderings of designers’ visions—may not go very far. And designs
conceived as product specifications or instructions that stakeholders are to
follow are effective only in established social structures that are commanded by
authorities. The artifacts that have a good chance to succeed need to be designed
to inspire diverse stakeholders, enroll them into the designers’ project, suggest
meanings that stakeholders can enact with the resources available to them, and
become the catalysts for the emergence of networks that facilitate their eventual
realization. When introducing the iPad, Steve Jobs was convinced that it would
“create its own landing strip.” His metaphor suggests that the best designs enlist
their stakeholders into cooperatives that assure their futures. Taking dialogue
seriously amounts to a considerable gestalt switch in conceptualizing the
artifacts that a design discourse needs to create.
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Its discourse community. Designers have no problem recognizing the
community to which they belong. They know each other by how they talk of their
work, iconic designs, influential designers, the schools they subscribe to or
oppose, where they had meet professionally, their specializations, and what
inspires them. However, the path to enter this community is not as formalized as
in other discourses. For example, PhD degrees in design have become more
frequent lately but are far from being a ticket to membership in the community of
designers. Some designers even consider academic qualifications obstacles to
being competent designers, and they may have a point, as advanced degrees are
often earned in disciplines that are epistemologically incompatible with the
design discourse. Moreover, designers often work in teams with experts from
other disciplines or design offices that rarely list the individuals participating in
them.

•

Institutionalization of recurrent practices. It should not be surprising that this
somewhat loosely-defined community of designers has been less successful in
institutionalizing essential design practices. Of course, many universities have
departments that teach one kind of design or another. They tend to develop
around particular philosophies, depending on whether they are housed with the
arts, the humanities, or engineering. There are only a few decisive textbooks but
quite a number of regularly appearing magazines. Several countries house
professional associations for designers. Computer-aided design is widely used
and has standardized some practices. There are internet discussion groups and
international meetings on specialized topics; none, however, unite the design
community as a whole. In the struggle to gain respect of the design profession
when collaborating in larger design projects or in the public, there is a
temptation to model design discourse on the sciences with a call for design
research (Friedman, 2003).31
Taking design research literally, I am suggesting instead that it inquire into the
practices of designers with the aim of improving their discourse and
institutionalizing successful design practices in the form of teachable methods,
principles, and practices. This objective renders design research the key for a
design discourse to remain current, to continuously redesign itself in response to
the changing realities that designers are facing.
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There are several obvious targets of design research that contrast with
traditional scientific research objectives. For one, designers’ interest in existing
realities is at best concerned with opportunities to intervene in current practices
or replacing problematic conditions. Therefore, one important focus of design
research is to reveal present variables, that is, what can be varied, intervened
with, and changed for the better. The invariances that traditional scientific
research seek to generalize, that is, what is believed to be un alterable, may have
to approached with skepticism and systematically questioned. Simon (1969)32
suggested that design is concerned with finding alternatives for improving
something, not with finding and following trends—with finding alternatives for
what can be decided upon, not with where decisions are foreclosed. In the public
domain of cultural artifacts, this means examining what people are bothered by,
inconvenienced, endangered, limited, or oppressed, where they have spent too
much of their scarce resources, experience failures, or cannot get to where they
want to be. Ethnographies of what is possible, conceivable, desirable, or
replaceable show considerable methodological promise (Merzali Celikoglu, et al.,
2017).33,34
I should mention that Simon (1969)35 related design to making improvements,
including solving problems. According to his conception, the success of a design
is measured relative to what currently exists. It ties designers to whoever defines
present reality. I claim that all of the more important innovations have started
from the other end, from imagining possible futures. Think of the invention of
printing, air conditioning, airplanes, or personal computing. None of them solved
problems recognized at the time of their inauguration. Designers succeeded by
envisioning realistic courses of actions to reach desirable possibilities. The point
is to measure designs not from how far they moved from the present rather how
close they come to desirable futures. There are methods to generate possibilities.
For example, combinatorial analysis systematically explores all combinations of a
list of technologies, functions, or practices. Among the human-centered methods
for generating viable possibilities is the use of conversations or brainstorming
sessions, analyses of popular novels, mythologies, fairytales, and science fiction.
They all narrate possibilities that their readers can imagine, talk of,
enthusiastically embrace, extrapolate, or abhor. Human flight, going to the moon,
Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial.
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cell phones, and artificial intelligence, all started in fictions. This is an
endorsement for studying futuristic literature.
Innovations can become real only if they motivate stakeholders to work towards
desirable futures, making it attractive to play their parts. The process of selecting
realizable paths that stakeholders could pursue is often clouded by claims of
designers’ ingenuity. But design research can easily examine the strategies that
designers employ to create such paths and explain them in ways that inspire their
stakeholders as well. Simon (1969)36 discussed some older methods, for example
optimizing, satisfying, and resource allocation. Steve Jobs emphasized
simplifying, minimalizing, and merging functions into intuitive user interfaces.
Others talk of synthesizing, integrating, reframing the familiar, using novel
materials, technologies, reconciling incompatible requirements, and increasing
diversity of uses. These are not just design principles, they also provide
convincing explanations for what encourages the imagination of innovative paths
to desirable futures.
Incidentally, some such methods can be found in literature as well and are taught
under the headline of composition with the aim of creating narratives that
compel their readers to read on and encourage conversations among them.
Some of these strategies seem vague largely because they involve the kind of tacit
knowledge that underlies most articulations: metaphors, synecdoches, and
images. Recognizing the difficulty of communicating tacit knowledge has
encouraged designers to invite stakeholders into ongoing design processes, socalled participatory design. It introduces into design processes meanings that one
could not find through interviews, allowing designers and stakeholders to learn
together, which can also generate surprises. But the more important benefit of
participatory design processes is that the results have a better chance to sail
through the network of stakeholders. Design research can develop these
strategies into teachable methods.
There are many more design practices that design research can address,
investigate for their effectiveness, and articulate for distribution with the design
discourse community.
•
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Their boundaries and those of most academic disciplines contrast sharply with
the constitutional necessity of a design discourse to be open to the discourses of its
stakeholders. Design discourse cannot but embrace their multitudes, coordinate
dialogue among them, and respect their criteria for participating in the networks
that bring its designs to fruition.
This necessary openness does not need to impinge on professional designers’
ability to define their own discourse community, institutionalize successful
design methods, and create the artifacts they are proud of conveying for use by
others. However, unlike most academic discourses, the criteria for accepting the
artifacts that designers develop are only partly theirs.
This acknowledgement prompted me to call a design discourse undisciplined.
Designers cannot impose their design logic on the discourses of their
stakeholders. They can plant the seeds of innovation but rarely control what
grows from it. To assure the efficacy of their artifacts, a design discourse needs to
institutionalize designers’ ability to listen to divergent voices, awaken voices that
are not volunteered, and transform what they hear into arguments for designs
that compel their stakeholders into action.
It also means that designs need to remain sufficiently open for stakeholders to
have their say. Inasmuch as design activity is fundamental to being human and a
major motivator to create artificial worlds to dwell in, I suggested that humancentered design needs to delegate design (Krippendorff, 2006: 74).37 It suggests
not limiting design to written specifications or definitive courses of actions for
stakeholders to follow, rather to provide sufficiently large spaces for
stakeholders to add their expertise in the process guiding a design through a
stakeholder network. The principal openness of computers to the many worlds
that their users can install can serve as a machine analogue of designs that can
inspire stakeholders to play their parts. The success of any design lies in traveling
through the networks of its stakeholders and opening spaces, one after another—
for everyone interested and enthused to contribute to what it ends up being.
Finally, designers cannot avoid being stakeholders in their own designs. In larger
development teams in which diverse experts work together, participants tend to
be assigned responsibilities that fall into the domain of their discourse.
Teamwork entails respecting the discourse of their members. The essential
openness of design discourse does not imply superiority. It merely enables
designers to cooperate with different discourses without claiming to be in charge
of a stakeholder network.
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Its justifications. Because the benefits of a design that leaves a design office can
be experienced only in some foreseeable future, its acceptability by stakeholders
hinges on the plausibility of the arguments that designers can advance for its
virtues. Substantiating such arguments calls on citing design research that was
undertaken in the development of a design and demonstrating what can be
expected from its realization. Such justifications are unlike the hard and often
quantitative evidence that other disciplines can bring to the table. I already
mentioned the need for designers to be critical of factual claims derived from
past data, and especially excluding the voices of other stakeholders. This may
well be a tall order, but whatever designers choose to cite, show, or simulate to
justify their work needs to be phrased in terms their stakeholders’ future.
Justifications apply to individual designs but design discourse also has a larger
mission. It needs to preserve or enhance the reputation of a productive design
profession. Design drives innovation. Human-centered design keeps a culture
viable and enables society to cope with its challenges. It stimulates competition
from within and responds to environmental changes from without. The
profession of design rises to its cultural mission only with a design discourse that
is able to justify itself in the very public to which it contributes its artifacts. It needs
to maintain its boundary while taking its place in the ecology of other discourses.

It should be apparent that the notion of a design discourse, as presented above,
resembles several features of conversation or dialogue, but on the level of communities
whose discourses it must respect as a condition for its own standing. I discussed most of
its features as the logical consequences of the realities that professional designers are
articulating today. I could not avoid this account of design discourse becoming
normative or deontic or what it should be. In a way, I applied design discourse to itself,
designing it in the course of the above. My hope is that design discourses inform design
education and expand designers’ attention from designing individual products to
designing human interfaces with all kinds of technologies, through them with other
members of the public, including strengthening the design discourse. This ideal is
increasingly recognized but faces some cultural barriers. I want to conclude by
mentioning four to be overcome.
•

One is the cultural commitment, already mentioned in the introduction, to a
representational conception of language; or, as Bakhtin would say, to monologue.
This accounts for the widespread failure to see that how language is used actually
matters. This blindness has a long history and many disciplines are trapped in it. In
the design profession it is encouraged by the traditional association of design with
the visual arts and aesthetics. Designing artifacts to be aesthetically pleasing and
showing this possibility in visualizations of proposed products nudges designers into
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representational conceptions, privileges visual forms over linguistic abstractions,
and keeps cultural innovations to a minimum. Moreover, the common form/content
distinction perpetuates the epistemologically impossible claim that texts and
artifacts are the containers of meaning. A shift to dialogical conceptions of reading
texts, focusing on interfaces with artifacts rather than what they are, and
conceptualizing design as a discourse that generates innovation should not be too
difficult. After all, designers talk—when working in teams, and with stakeholders—
during which meanings can multiply and artifacts that permit these meanings come
to fruition. I have said elsewhere that any design needs to survive in the discourses of
its stakeholders (Krippendorff, 2006)38
•

A related barrier results from the interpenetrations of discourses with
incompatible epistemologies. One source of such interpenetrations stems from
designers’ professional preoccupation with competing among each other to be at
the cutting edge of cultural developments. This can manifest itself by talking of
their designs in terms of the discourses of fashionable disciplines, without
realizing that all discourses come with discourse-specific epistemologies that
could and often do undermine the cultural objectives of the design profession. I
discussed the incommensurability of natural science and design discourses. This
applies to the uncritical use of the currently trendy discourse of the cognitive
sciences as well. Conceptualizing cognition in terms of computer metaphors
cannot explain human agency and the deliberate introduction of innovations into
communities. Cognition is, without a doubt, involved in all human interfaces, but
it cannot cope with the social construction of the world we live in.
Such interpenetrations are also evident in the efforts of one discourse to colonize
another. Marketing, for example, seeks to usurp design by defining it as a way to
increase sales. Arguing under this umbrella will surely limit design to redesigning
the forms of artifacts that improve their attractiveness over those of competitors.
Accepting such a definition would divert designers’ attention from the larger aim
of assuring cultural viability.

•

38

Related to the above, many design projects serve corporate interests in particular
markets without concerns for unintended consequences and the effects on
communities outside the target population. This economic rationality renders
larger systems perspectives and ethical considerations secondary to the wellbeing of corporations. It provides no space for ecological concerns, unless
activists forcefully oppose environmentally unsustainable designs. It ignores the
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harm done to communities whose voices are denied because they may not be
able to make use of a design. Furthermore, it privileges short-term objectives,
tends to perpetuate social inequalitiy, digital divides along racial lines, intrusive
artifacts like spyware, and sowing distrust in the public sphere by distributing
misinformation and buying elections. Imposing corporate interests surely
undermines a design discourse’s obligation to attend to its cultural consequences,
which are grounded in the respect for the multitudes of other discourses.
•

Finally, while professional designers are eager to embrace research results that
facilitate their work, there is hardly any tradition and perhaps not enough
incentive to document what they did; why, by which methods, and how their
designs were received, especially when unsuccessful. This does not bode well for
the kind of design research that could improve the design discourse for the
community of designers. Evaluations of design practices call on experiences with
successes and failures, not just talk of one’s own achievements and others’
fiascoes. Universities are primed to undertake design research of this kind. But as
long as universities limit themselves to train design practitioners and practicing
designers are reluctant to reveal their own practices to members of their
community, the design discourse will not evolve as it could.

As promised in the title, this paper focused on the discourses involved in designing
meaningful human interfaces with artifacts that end up populating the public sphere. It
articulated the dimensions of a design discourse by contrasting them with those of
conversations and other discourses, relying on a dialogical lens throughout. Convinced
that many of these dimensions are also at home in the discourses of other social-changeoriented professions, I invite readers to explore how they might apply to their own
experiences to the process, in the hope of refining their own discourse.
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